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ABSTRACT 
 
 
This is a case study of top management in a Swedish pulp industry at Skutskär. After 
decades of proactive response to change, starting in 1976 the pulp industry experienced a 
rapid and significant restructuring. In 1992, and after  a prolonged hold on local 
investments, came a large-scale investment with major labor reductions, which created a 
local crisis. The aim of this study is to analyze how top managers of a local business plant 
perceive and explain their citizenship relationship to the community of the company town 
during a transition period from 1976 to 2007. Our study shows that too much reliance on 
top management cost reduction requirements and not caring, or underscoring, local social 
concerns created gaps and local stakeholder distrust. We discuss how prolonged distrust of 
the company to bear social responsibility ended up in a broken relationship between the 
company and the local community. Our case indicates at least two problems that must be 
handled for successful  corporate citizenship. First, the traditional control-oriented 
management view is too narrow and not adjusted to today’s citizenship reality, including 
how to handle corporate social responsibility. Second, we can see a possibility where the 
conceived needs on a global corporate level may lead to situations to obscure local needs 
and consequences. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Globalization and increasing competitive pressures have accentuated the corporate need to 
cut labor costs and speedup productivity gains. Different studies have illustrated the  
economic consequences (Gibbs, 1993; Hurry, 1993)
 as well as the social consequences 
(Bowdich and Buono, 2001)
 for the heavy industry of such strategies. Until recently the 
latter has appeared as a public urgency, and the pressure on business managers to take 
responsibility for social consequences of business actions, is increasing  (Johnson and 
Greening, 1999). This trend is evident in Sweden, a country with a long tradition of state 
involvement and far-reaching responsibility of social tasks. Increasingly the Swedish 
government has imposed rules and also put pressures on the business sectors, to take their 
share and responsibilities for health care, job replacements and environmental control. 
Scholars addressing these problems present arguments promoting increased, explicit, and 
targeted efforts for an enlargement of  corporate social responsibility  (CSR),  based on 
general business and profit motives as well as a response to social expectations (Googins 
and Rochlin, 2000). Looking at cases of proactive business efforts, van den Berg et al 
(2004) find support to these arguments and also list several reasons which either favor or 
hinder the development of social collaboration. 
Corporate citizenship is considered as a possible ideology to handle the complexity of 
increasing competition, conflicts and power imbalances in the society  (Googins and 
Rochlin, 2000). Corporate citizenship (CC) refers to the legitimacy level of responsibility 
from how society grants legitimacy and power to business. In the long run, those who do 
not use power in a manner which society considers responsible will tend to lose it (Wood, 
1991)”. It is important for corporate firms to become accepted and looked upon as citizens 
in a similar way as any individual; a relationship where corporate managers proactively and 
on equal premises are involved in building and maintaining the infrastructure of 
communities in which they  are located. This is  rewarding for the business itself as 
cooperation is likely to be more effective than acting as being apart from local interests 
(Vidaver-Cohen and Altman, 2000). But the ideal CC built on reciprocity is “still exception 
rather than rule” which  contrasts the traditional  patriarchal  corporation  as  giver and 
community as taker mentality. It also challenges traditional shareholder and profit-only 
ideology of business management theory (van den Berg et al. 2004) as the discourse in 3 
 
strategic management literature follows basic rationality principles of efficiency and 
productivity (Caves, 1992, Bowditch and Buono, 2001).  
Vidaver-Cohen  and Cohen (2000)  stress  that  the concept  of CSR  is not a new 
phenomenon but it has a current implication. To our knowledge the discussion of CC has 
not been applied or tested on a very differential context of smaller towns with a historical 
large dependency on one single company referred to as “company towns”. Garner (1992) 
defines a company town as “a settlement built and operated by a single enterprise”. One 
special feature of a company town is a long tradition of deep socio-economic relationships 
between the company and the community. Traditionally these relationships also have been 
major prerequisites for the development and success of the company and the community 
(Wheat and Florian, 2003). Because of local infrastructure building engagements, we can 
suggest that in many places a situation of CC was the case although primarily it was the 
company  who  took the  most initiatives  (Roth,  1992).  For  company  towns,  the social 
consequences of globalization, changed ownership structure and industrial restructuring 
have been some difficult issues to manage. Managers in these towns face institutionalized 
pressures of a local community to enhance, or at least continue to preserve, a local vitality. 
Taken together, traditional relationships have created a number of expectations of shared 
interests from the community on the company and its management, but mainly as a hidden 
agenda.  
Many researchers argue that  social actors constitute and shape the structure of 
organizations (van den Berg et al, 2004). However, researchers and practitioners disagree 
whether  if and how management responsibilities should include the needs of the local 
communities in which they operate (Scott, 2003). Main issues discussed in this connection 
include companies' responsiveness and ability to separate traditional management conduct 
from local responsibilities (Moss  Kanter, 2003);  value of short term  uncoordinated 
philanthropic  efforts  (Porter and Kramer, 2006);  establishment of programs (Vidaver-
Cohen and Altman, 2000) and  philanthropic  strategies (Porter and Kramer, 2002) that 
support sustainable CSR incentives. 
Considering the CSR discussion and the traditional ideology of management, we find 
there are a number of unsettled questions about how social responsibilities can be a natural 
part of management. The above discussion offers different dimensions and suggestions to 
deal with social responsibility problems by the multinational companies. However, these 
views are mainly based on theoretical arguments (van den Berg et al. 2004) as empirical 
examples are rare. Our company town case in this study presents a situation where a certain 4 
 
level of local solidarity and a number of social relationships between the company and 
society are known and established as a part of the culture. The company has vested a great 
deal of effort in building good local relationships, although the importance of such 
relationships has decreased over time. An interesting question here is  how  local 
management handles the transition from traditional to today’s citizenship requirements by 
following the guidelines of the multinational corporation. 
The aim of this study is to analyze how top managers of a local business plant 
perceive and explain their citizenship relationship to the community of the company town 
during a transition period from 1976 to 2007.  By presenting a case with a CC like situation 
we offer a narrative approach for understanding CC sustainability as the local dominant 
company  becomes one of the  business  units  of a multinational corporation. We also 
investigate how practiced management deals and confronts with the already established 
social responsibilities during this transition period.  
Our study is  mainly  based on interviews with  members of the  management  and 
employee unions of a Swedish/Finish pulp manufacturing company, and politicians of the 
local community. After decades of proactive responses to change, the managers supported 
a prolonged period of discontinuation of investments and pursued an inactive role relating 
to local development. During this period the local business plant followed a rapid and 
significant restructuring program of the multinational corporation by ignoring local need of 
new investments and social attentions. In 1992, this “no investment” practice finally ended 
up in a large-scale  rationalization  with major manpower  reduction.  The  corporate 
management priority of productivity and cost reductions were, for a long time, preferred to 
local needs of revitalization.   
One significant contribution of this paper is its focus on the company town and the 
corporate citizenship from a historical perspective into the transition of the local company 
as a part of the global management. The longitudinal view offers a deep insight on the 
process of development of the local company from a major success to economical failure 
resulting communication and integration problem with the local community and the 
corporation.  Further, this  study has shown that traditional management practice is not 
enough to incorporate social responsibility in the changing requirement of the multinational 
company.  
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CITIZENSHIP - PAST AND PRESENT 
 
Although quite recently the interest of CC  has increased, the social responsibility 
discussion is of late origin (Lantos, 2001). Company towns are outstanding in the way they 
provide early empirical evidence of how companies’  social and economic business 
performance could build long lasting citizenship in local communities (Fishback, 1992). 
Even though many of the company towns have lost their basic economic role, some of 
them experience sweeping changes as the traditional local dominant company becomes a 
part of a multinational company seeking multinational goals and interests.  
 
Company Town Citizenship  
 
In his edited book “The company town”, John S. Garner (1992) presents good empirical 
evidences on how the industrial communities (towns) could be found in countries that 
embraced “capitalism” during the Industrial Revolution. Between 1830 and 1930 many 
company towns have established, grew and prospered as an effect of the growth of one 
single plant and with its roots mainly  in the resource based industry  (Ahnlund and 
Brunnström, 1992).  The initial poverty, their isolation from the outside world, the 
prevailing and dominance of one single enterprise has given these industrial towns their 
unique socio-institutional characteristics (Garner, 1992).  
Early, the company town citizenship became marked by mechanical and labor intense 
production,  an  overall power distance between superiors and subordinates, and the 
paternalism of social engagement in infrastructure building efforts and programs. Initially 
most company towns were owned by a family or in partnership dedicating them great 
power at work and as citizens in the community as well. Later, this all-embracing power 
became a management preference associated with leadership position. The resource based 
industries with high degree of mechanization became soon criticized to foster machine-
enslaved workers. Social upheaval, strikes and the outside level criticism against the labor 
destitution, together with the acute need of labor in production, were some reasons on how 
the paternalism of company towns commonly extended beyond pure economic incitements 
(Garner, 1992). Infra-structure activities such as building houses, meeting halls, company 
shops, schools, and initiating educational and social welfare programs, were voluntarily 
undertaken by the owners (Ahnlund and Brännström, 1992; Candee, 1992).  6 
 
Although the social caring of paternalism was intended to reform the social life of 
workers, it is claimed to have institutionalized a giver and taker mentality that actually 
hampered labor self initiatives. Most company town studies in Garner (1992) have devoted 
great interests on early historical evidence and less on how traditional citizenship confronts 
and deals with the transition into a globalized corporate management system. In Swedish 
research, some attention has been paid to the consequences of structural crises after labor 
reduction and approaches finding solutions to new economic conditions (Höglund, 2001). 
Less attention is paid on how globalization has changed local management and its social 
responsibility to local community.   
 
Corporate Citizenship –Ideology and Criticism 
 
Over the last decades,  CSR research has paid  a  great attention to how companies 
increasingly invest in social programs to “do well by doing good” enriching society in 
ways that are good for business while increasing shareholder values. The CSR legitimacy 
derives from the ideal of  business and society as  interwoven entitles why society has 
expectation  that goes beyond economic performance on corporate good citizenship 
engagements (Wood, 1991).   
The CSR perspective is rooted in Carroll’s (1979) four-part legitimacy definition of 
CSR categories in economic, legal, ethical and discretionary (also mentioned as 
philanthropic or altruistic) responsibilities. The legitimacy extension is commonly viewed 
from shareholder (owners), stakeholder (interest groups) and citizenship (society) point of 
view.  Globalization  with  variation of citizenship qualifications has, however,  increased 
complexity to handle larger domains of responsibilities. From a citizenship perspective a 
holistic approach is assumed, paying attention to various stakeholders’  interests and 
broader society expectations (Galbreath, 2006). As global citizens, corporations  are 
expected to deal with their all constituents, i.e., global, national as well as internal sides of 
the organizations. Foremost, their main obligations are restricted to localities in which the 
corporation has an operative presence (Vidaver-Cohen and Altman, 2000).   
The CC perspective is criticized as an ideology because it is difficult to apply in 
practical work situations.  From  the  ideal  or CC model  perspective, corporations and  
corporate leaders should act as citizen in each community in which they operate (Vidaver-
Cohen and Altman, 2000). Business leaders should voluntarily rectify harms and establish 
sustainable, reciprocal community relations by proactively collaborating in programs and 7 
 
infra-structure building activities that goes beyond easy-going philanthropic efforts (ibid.). 
To comply with reciprocity requirements, forward-thinking managers are expected to build 
up partnership for local community infra-structure (schools, education and training) 
development  and encouraging  students’  learning activities.  Partnership  engagements  as 
two-ways process of interaction (Burchell and Cook, 2006) are expected to trace the ways 
to provide sustainable communities and new business opportunities (Googins and Rochlin, 
2000).  Especially, in  countries  suffering from  domestic government resources,  the 
partnerships can combine CSR and strategic investment to ensure sustainable business as 
well as community opportunities (Damiano-Teixeira and Pompermayer, 2007). This 
citizenship is also reinforced by the European Commission’s (2002) recommendation about 
the positive impact of CSR on business and societies, particularly  in  the  developing 
countries.  
The criticism of CC concerns how stakeholder demands often are mutually exclusive, 
paying attention to the impossibilities in how to treat all stakeholders as being of equally 
importance. Specially, as in a global context, stakeholders are often judged as being of 
primary or secondary importance (Galbreath,  2006).  Therefore, by discretion,  business 
leaders need to sort out which stakeholder or stakeholder group to prioritize. An inevitable 
part of citizenship arguments include  degrees of stakeholder discrimination -  also 
comprising to which local communities to serve. Studies have also shown difficulties in 
how to achieve reciprocity in engagements as corporate leaders commonly see partnership 
efforts as marginal while community leaders are more salient (Boehm, 2002).  
The experience of conflicting gains and long-term requirement to fulfill reciprocity 
engagements  have  increased  the need of  CSR formalization in policies, reports and 
programs.  For instance,  CC  research (Vidaver-Cohen and Altman, 2000)  proposes  a 
comprehensive partnership program referred to as “an architecture of excellence” covering 
a “five-phase cycle”  beginning with identification of community threats and ending up in 
formalized strategies inherent in both corporate and community procedures. CC research 
also  gives  evidence  to  uncoordinated initiatives in CSR efforts undertaken  (Porter and 
Kramer, 2006). In practice corporate leaders are giving priority to selected division and 
regions, not the corporation as a group. Even if having formalized CSR as the prescribed 
norm of action, informal practices may be decoupled from formal policies (Westphal and 
Zajac, 2001).     
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METHODOLOGY 
 
In this section,  we describe  how we have approached to present  the case of the local 
company, its citizenship and social engagements, and the restructuring process it has gone 
through over a longer period. The local company is located in Skutskär, largest town in 
Älvkarleby municipality, Sweden and belongs to a Swedish/Finish multinational company. 
 
A Time-Serial Research Approach 
 
In approaching the case by identifying critical events and changed practices over time, a 
time-serial approach is used. The term “practice” represents a repetitive performance in 
order  to attain recurrent, habitual, or routinised accomplishment of particular actions 
(Jarzabkowski, 2004).  Our use of practice  implies  that  managers in daily action are 
influenced by rules and routines but depending on the mode of institutionalization and 
responses of change, exogenous influences may change the indigenous order (Giddens, 
1986).  Barley  (1986)  has applied the principles of practice  in the development of  a 
sequential model to map qualitative aspects of change over time. In this study, the model is 
primarily used as an analytical tool to map different structures of management conduct over 
time. The structuring process,  as  used by us in  the  model  (Figure 1),  assumes that 
management conduct has not only influence on business performance but also on social 
responsibilities of the company as well as the company town community.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 9 
 
______________________________________________________________________ 
FIGURE 1 An Adjusted Barley (1986) Sequential Model of the Structuring Process 
   
Indigenous effects of management practice on structure 
 
 
 
 
                            
 
 
   
 
 
Figure 1. An adjusted Barley (1986) sequential model of a structuring process. The denser background     
signifies that practices from previously structure have effects on the next structure of development. 
 
 
In his analysis, Barley presumes that technological change and related scripts (rules that 
defines roles) change the structure of working life over time (T1-T3). We assume that 
technological change in investments  (from  global  competitive  pressure  and strategic 
change)  through  the applications of new scripts  initiate changed rules and routines 
(indigenous processes) and thus, may change management realm of action and how they 
structure daily life. As shown by the model, management response on change also depends 
on the degree of institutionalization - that is how work is structured, repeatedly used and 
commonly accepted as the right thing to do the work.  
 
Development of the Case study 
 
As we believe that investments have influence on management practice, a general overview 
of investments from the early establishment of the company and the company town into the 
present has been carried out.  Inspired by explorative integrative case design and grounded 
theory, this study is drawn upon multiple sources of evidence to identify links over time 
between events, reactions, including behaviors and decisions as they occur but also as new 
questions have come up (Maalöe, 2002). We have found special usefulness in identifying 
manager’s perception of changes that conflict with existing management practices.  
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According to Hodgson (2001), the principles of heredity and environment are vital for 
the understanding of the embedded nature between socio-institutional inertia and 
management action. We assume that traditional ties may have influence on both economic 
and social responsiveness on change. Barley’s model is used to illustrate responsiveness on 
change in different phases over time. In the company town case, three different phases are 
focused: the proactive phase - the growth and prosperity of industry and company town 
from 1890s until 1976, the inactive (relating to local development) phase - between 1976 
and 1992, and the reactive phase - after the crisis in 1992 until 2007. A quite similar time 
perspective has been used by Hyder and Eriksson (2005) to offer a historical background of 
a strategic alliance between two multinationals.       
Historical texts, a personnel newspaper, and STORA annual reports gave information 
of early change processes and the movement into a specific industrial socio-economic order. 
These texts articulated the development from the early phase of the industrial establishment 
from the 1890s into the 1940s. These materials further provided documentations of the 
planning of the community, early settlements, working life, the emerging specific parts of 
the community directly related to the saw-mill (a part of the local company which had  been 
closed down afterward), and the early industrial epoch. One book by Åkerlind et al. (1989) 
described  the development of the pulp company  over time and includes a good 
documentation of the spirit and pride underlying the improvements of industrial activity. 
This source also gave information about key actors and important investments until 1988. 
The annual business reports provided useful information about strategic decisions of the 
corporation for the restructuring program from 1984 to 1995.  Statistical information was 
gathered from different documents and Statistics Sweden (population statistics 1985 – 2000 
and historical documentations from 1890s). Calculation of factual employment/population 
rate over time and change of employment/population rate over time provided information on 
correlation and covariance. 
Interviews with the key members of the plant management were the central sources of 
information in this study. These managers were responsible for management activities after 
1970. Their reflections though, extend from the 1940s until 2007. We selected four 
managers from the top management with the qualifications of having long experience of 
economic and strategic decisions taken in the company. Our presumption is that they had 
the necessary knowledge of investment decisions (exogenous changes),  how these 
decisions were converted into actions in the plant (indigenous processes) and an opinion on 
their importance for the company town context (local socio-institutional order). These key 11 
 
actors had been active in the pulp company during their whole working life and have also 
experiences from other industry units. The local business unit manager (BM between 1995 
– 2005), had management experience from another plant, while the other two managers 
M1, employed in 1970, and M2, employed in 1981, both had management experience from 
different tasks of the plant. Thus, M1 and M2 had long experience from different divisions 
and worked within the plant while an important contribution of the BM was his outside 
perspective. In 2003 additional interviews with manager M3, employed in 1972, and in 
2005 with administrator A1, employed in 2000, were performed. We have no indications 
other than that the chosen managers do represent management modes of the local company.  
To contrast local management statements from a citizen perspective, five interviews, 
two with local politicians: P1 – community councilor between 1989-1998 & chairman of 
community delegation from 1998-; P2 - community councilor from 1998- and three with  
employee  representatives for three different unions: U1, employed 1982-; U2, employed in 
1988-; and U3 employed between 1971-1974 and from 1980-, were conducted in 2007. The 
politicians provided information about local community reciprocity both in their roles as 
citizens and as community leaders, while the contributions of the employee representatives 
reflected their engagement as workers, representatives for the labor force and citizens of 
the community.      
To illustrate the development over time, a simple life-cycle model based on statistical 
information was used in the interviews. Confronted with the model, the interviewees were 
asked to specify their narratives with most possible exactness to the point in time when the 
action occurred.  We used open-ended questions. To emphasize their narratives on the most 
important events over time, we asked questions like "What happened in the industry in this 
phase?", “What was your own opinion? followed by "What was the opinion in the 
community?”  We expected that these narratives could be related to how investment 
programs structured management practices,  caused the shift into the next phase of 
development and influenced the social relationship in the company town.   
All key informants have reviewed their parts of the case study protocol to confirm the 
reliability of the data. In cases of misconceptions or data completion, the case study 
protocol has been changed to be in line with the interviewees’ conception. Citations from 
the respondents have been frequently used in the case presentation partly to show the 
authenticity of the data and partly to keep the logical flow of information reporting. 
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RISE AND DECLINE OF A MILL AND  
A COMMUNITY – THE CASE 
 
The intimate relationship between the local company and the community is perceptible in 
the statistical data (Population statistics 1985 – 2000). The development over time shows a 
life-cycle character of a positively correlated employment and population rate over time. 
The positive correlation returned the covariance of 0,62 and the correlated change rate 
0,81, which indicates a positive relationship between the development of the local company 
and the community. The statistics illustrate how work opportunities also increased the 
population in Skutskär, the home of the local company.   
In the late 19
th century the wood industry grew in importance and many saw-mills 
were established. In 1868, two Norwegians, H R Astrup and N G Sörensen, founded a saw-
mill in Skutskär, which later turn out to be one of the most important establishments in 
northern Europe. In 1885, the saw-mill merged with STORA Kopparbergs Bergsslag AB 
and in 1896 the production was expanded to include pulp producing 6000 metric ton. 
Between 1868 and 1900 the work force increased from 300 to 1700 and the population of 
Skutskär increased from 2927 to 9348. Gradually, the industrial society was built up with 
water supply, public baths, self-owned houses, a school, a meeting-place and a grocery 
shop inside the industrial area. A patriarchal spirit governed the life in the community. The 
authority of the company was not questioned and the managers were expected to influence 
the community after traditional economic and social principles, commonly understood as 
very bureaucratic and imperative. 
  In 1932, the administration was divided into two different business units with a 
separate executive  manager  (EM)  for pulp administration. The head engineers were 
commonly commissioned the assignment as local business unit  managers  (BM). The 
employment of Sixten Sandberg (1904 – 1932) turned out to be a great success due to his 
contribution of technological improvements in different production areas. His importance 
for the Swedish pulp industry became evident mostly because of his training of young 
engineers in relation to technological constructions. During his leadership, the first research 
laboratory in cellulose chemistry was built. Even internationally, Sandberg was greatly 
admired because of his ingenious construction skills.   
After the First World War, new investments increased pulp production from 27720 
metric ton in 1932 to 106188 metric ton in 1938. After the Second World War, the industry 13 
 
conditions changed with  an increased demand on the pulp market initiating  a time of 
prosperity. This meant for the local company having an assortment of eleven different 
products. The post-war period into the 1970s was characterized by differentiation in which 
management of the business unit (four  EMs and five BMs) carried out the mission to 
expand into different lines but in separate areas.  Especially noticed was Per Collin (BM, 
1958  –  1971)  who made the whole line of pulp production to adopt  conveyor belt 
principles. He also encouraged the need of modern living in the community. The 
considerable imbalance between managers and blue-collar workers in economic and social 
welfare  clearly divided the inhabitants of  the community  in two distinct and unequal 
groups. 
    
There was a housing area for the managers, for the employees in administration 
and for the blue-collar workers. I remember, in the community  there was a 
shopkeeper, and once wife to an engineer entered the shop and the shopkeeper 
gave her the preference in the queue and offered her the best parts of the food. 
(M2)  
 
Commonly, managers in high positions had private advantages. There was a huge 
difference between executives and the collectives. (BM) 
 
My childhood and adolescence was idyllic. We had a private chauffeur and he 
took me to the school. The production increased and gave security in employment 
and the mill was central in people’s  life, the hub, with a growing employee 
demand.  My life was privileged with parties, torch, our own chauffeur and the 
relations to the people. (M1) 
 
The saw-mill and the whole business unit represented the hub in the community 
necessary for living. But it was a hierarchy comprising of senior engineers. I 
never played  with their children –  it was a  great difference between groups. 
Business managers such as Collin were superior to others. I saw them driving 
across the market place. I stood there holding my cap in the hand. (P1) 
 
Everything in society was the company. In 1966, when the company was most 
successful, it felt great to be a part of the company. I remember Collin and 14 
 
foreman Kvarnström. In one occasion foreman Kvarnström came shouting - 
Leave  everything, we need to clean up, Wallenberg (corporate chairman) is 
coming! Later, he just passed by sitting in a car. (P2) 
 
In the beginning of the 1970s it was still "the spin of the wheels" although the enterprise 
experienced market fluctuations as a result of the oil crisis and occasional deficit of fibers. 
In 1976, a comprehensive investment was carried out with a concentration on the core 
activity improvements. It was followed by the end of the sulphite production era. 
   
We had a good reputation in our line of business. In Sweden we were subjected to 
a low degree of competition and we were very upset by the new situation. (M1) 
 
There were tremendously good years from 1970 to 1973. My superior said, “You 
can buy whatever you want.” There were many mills and still it was possible to 
have a personal talk with the managing director Lindblad in Stora Kopparberg. 
(M2) 
 
As a result of the “you-reform”, the unfairness between superiors and blue-collar 
workers were fading away during 1970s.  During the 1970s people lived with the 
greatness of the large enterprise. Even afterwards they remember the times when 
it was easy to get a job and the mill had a diversified production. (BM) 
 
By 1970s the population increased to 10276 (the highest level ever) and the number of 
employees increased to 1550, representing 15% of the population. The pulp production 
increased from 287735 metric ton in 1969 to 433540 in 1988. During this period, plant 
managers started to experience increased fluctuations in production but also a dramatic 
change.  
 
In 1980, we closed down the saw-mill. The situation was dramatic. One of the 
most important saw-mills in Europe was closed down. It gave an atmosphere of 
hostility. (BM) 
 
The closing-down of the saw-mill  was a shock. The year before the 
discontinuation,  the company invested over 100 million SEK in the saw-mill. 15 
 
Nobody understood what happened. The saw-mill and the pulp factory which, 
together make the local business unit, have been a symbol of security. (M2) 
 
By 1987 the population had decreased to 9082 and the employees to 1100, representing 
12% of the population. Apart from the closure of the saw-mill, the period between 1976 
and 1992 was experienced as “safe” as  “not much happed”  during the period.  In  the 
beginning of the 1990s, both buildings and machinery were seriously worn-out. At the 
corporate level a critical decision was made in the beginning of the 1980s, to initiate a 
comprehensive change process which concerned all corporate units in one way or another. 
The mission was twofold – (1) expansion through larger and more stable corporate units in 
Europe and (2) disinvestments to free resources for exclusively concentrating on profitable 
product areas. It was important, the CEO claims; 
 
to ensure that as many people as possible feel respected within, and motivated by, 
their new working environment, while simultaneously encouraging them to 
understand and accept the necessity of cooperating across business area borders in 
order to fully exploit the synergistic effects and take advantage of new forms of 
management and new routines. (CEO)   
 
The new restructuring program required every business unit to increase profitability and  
moderate the sensitivity to economic fluctuations, increase productivity and efficiency in 
existing production lines, give priority to selected well developed production areas 
(refinement areas) and less priority to declining areas (wood and pulp business units falling 
from 48% to 21%), and integrate the pulp production and sales area. This was estimated to 
a total labor reduction during 1990 – 1992 with more than 6500 employees in the whole 
corporation.  
        For managers at the business unit in Skutskär, this new strategy was a shock. 
 
The period between 1976 and 1992 was peaceful and we felt secure. We didn’t 
know what happened  behind the scenes.  It was a changed attitude. People 
believed they could afford to refuse shift work and it was a great wastage of 
resources. (U3) 
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Already in the 1980s there were indications of change due to increases of prices 
and costs. In the beginning of the 1990s it was felt as a catastrophe. It was like 
being hit by a bomb, the Hiroshima in Skutskär. The loyalty was tied to security. 
The new situation demanded top management training and middle management 
training. In 1992 we had a meeting about how to reduce costs. The total labor 
reduction, from 1000 to 650 employees, implied that 350 persons had to leave 
their jobs. It was a shock - traumatic for everyone involved." (M1) 
 
1992 came as a shock for everybody. We should have explained the aim of the 
method in another way. In reality work doesn’t  disappear that quickly. We 
received a general order from STORA Cell to rationalize as much as possible. The 
information came from the head office. We are no experts, behavior scientists, in 
knowing how to do this in the best possible way. Fathers, sons, families were 
given the notice to quit their jobs. (M2) 
 
The municipal executive board received the information from the county 
administration board, not from the company. (P1) 
 
Today, we notice the suspiciousness among people in the community. During the 
year 1991 and 1992, we were regarded as the tool of extreme capitalism. It was 
difficult to assert that the pressure from the surrounding world suddenly required 
a reduction of employees. They said - What the hell, why haven’t they seen this 
happened before? Why was this necessary? It was taken as a devilry.” (M1) 
 
Top executives had other things to concentrate their energy on – the corporation 
and the expansion. I have a feeling that the mill, during the 1980s, was managed 
by top managers in the executive’s board and not by the people at the plant. The 
local managers in Skutskär were too socially concerned and the mill was run 
based on local security criteria, the way it was, but they also listened too much to 
the top managers. Skutskär was a mill in which the values of the community were 
deeply rooted. When I started my employment in the mill I was shocked to realize 
how far they were behind in development in Skutskär. (BM) 
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The traditional industrial community may have contributed to make  people 
feeling that they lived in a "bubble" lulled into a security, which showed to be 
false. Although facing the presence of necessary changes, we believe that both 
local managers and employees were "caught in bed" by an evil reality and reacted 
with inertia. (M1, M2) 
 
In 1995 the company was seriously worn down and after a critical pending period, 
corporate top management decided to initiate a comprehensive five year investment 
program called “Project 2000”. In December 1998, STORA and Enso merged to build 
STORAEnso, with headquarter in Finland, with an explicit goal for world leadership. The 
global competitive situation required industrial restructuring incitements. Afterwards, local 
managers not only experienced increased cost control and efficiency pressure but also the 
need to retain the local loyalty being lost.   
 
 To improve methods in production, we need to be in the front - all the time to do 
things better and never to be content before next change. There is always a need 
for improvement and all the time we have to identify them. (M3)  
 
We have no dependency on the local community but we want a relationship with 
the community. We want them to understand our production situation. We have a 
moral engagement. It is important to be here and we visit the schools and tell 
them that this is a nice place to work. We sponsor a lot – for instance golf tours. 
(M1) 
 
I live in the community and I can tell you, they ‘know’ how it is. In a haphazard 
manner they talk about terminations. There is a local perception that a wrong 
picture of the company has been given. Staff redundancy is a hash experience 
especially due to the difficulties to explain the need of change while keeping to 
the same product line and without increasing production capacity. (A) 
 
In 2005, the former business executive manager (here BM) was replaced by an executive 
manager with the responsibility of two pulp production units. 
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The former BM wanted to be a part of the society, for the new BM, local is 
indifferent. (U3) 
 
The former BM was unbelievably appreciated by the local community because of 
his citizenship engagement. He was on the same level as us and cared about the 
environment.  His replacement was cruel and we couldn’t believe it was true. 
Afterwards there are no contacts between the company and the society at all. 
Nothing, no collaboration, no talk, no discussions  at all. We want more co-
operation, more engagements in public responsibility and debates. (P1)  
 
The new business manager is anonymous. We lack information about what 
happens in the plant. We want an open discussion. In cases of information, all 
their talk is about the corporate greatness in relation to competition, their concern 
about increased costs and price pressure. It seems like everything is about short 
term profit instead of long term thinking.  (P1) 
 
The new BM had the mission to reduce costs in production and to secure long term growth. 
To fulfill these goals in 2005 – 2006, additional 110 employees were required to quit their 
jobs. In 2007 the total labor force dropped to 350 employees. 
 
In the last rationalization, the labor distrust was bigger. For us in the union, it 
became a shock to realize that the factory did not perform well. (U2)     
 
DISCUSSION 
 
Our empirical data illustrates a drastic change of the relationship between the community 
of Skutskär and the company. With increased democracy in society until the 1970s, the 
development of Skutskär and the local company was a success story. Afterwards came a 
period of stagnation for almost two decades followed by a major restructuring of the plant. 
At the same time the focus of control of the local company, turned from a local-national to 
a global management. The drastic effects of these changes are communicated in 
expressions like “shock”, “hit by a bomb”, “hostility” and “caught in the bed” indicating 
how restructuring took the local management by surprise. 19 
 
We will now analyze some important features from our case by observing how local 
management was practiced.  First, we address the inactive phase of management during the 
period 1976-1992, describing how local development received low priority and how the 
“no investment policy” resulted into a conflict between global and local processes at the 
local management level. Second, we pay attention to how a postponed  investment 
continued to keep the institutionalization  of  old  management practice alive. Third, we 
illustrate how economic considerations underlying the structural crisis gave unanticipated 
socio-economic consequences not only for  local management identity and role  in the 
company but also in respect to local community citizenship relations.    
 
Corporate Strategy Not Locally Understood 
 
The aim of the corporate strategy was not distinctly articulated for and understood ex ante 
among local managers and hence, we presume that enough communication and sharing of 
information could not  take place at the  different levels of the corporation. Being 
responsible for production, the local management (see T2, figure 1) followed a defensive 
but conflicting strategy while simultaneously trying to balance increased productivity with 
worn out technology,  meeting  requirements for cost reductions,  and  fulfilling  social 
responsibility to the community.  
From  annual reports we have found that before 1984 there was a shortage of 
information within the corporation. Caves (1992) points out that, top managers of giant 
corporations have several goals and in general they have neither the time nor the resources 
to find out how well local management is running their businesses apart from looking at 
bottom line economics. This is in line with the case, in which increased competition from 
new and more successful competitors urged for an offensive corporate strategy.  It is 
reasonable to assume that weak  corporate communication also meant increased top 
management distance  to  the local business unit’s  needs  apart from looking at basic 
economic responsibilities.  
It was evident in the case that there were several signals of a changed corporate 
strategy. The offensive corporate strategy required capital for international growth, which 
could be accomplished through an extensive cost reduction in some corporate units. The 
corporate restructuring program was explicitly mentioned in annual reports, and therefore 
is evident that the new corporate strategy was known to the local management. In our case 
we have seen  that  the advantages  and the security experienced in previous periods 20 
 
gradually crumbled. The relations linking a collection of diverse organization into a joint 
collaboration faded away and the mill became secluded from the network as the contacts 
with other companies in the business line ceased to exist. This inactive period of the local 
management may be understood as a “signal-to-noise” ratio. According to Bowditch and 
Buono (2001) we can see signals of change but not wishing to “hear” them due to the 
“noise” around - as in our case – local managers were too busy in how to reduce costs 
while increase productivity within the increasingly worn down organizational structure.      
As a result, after 1970s local management lost their control of the plant development 
in becoming a part of a global corporation. But apparently, they did not take any active part 
in the  corporate  management  either.  Loss  of control and the upcoming reality of 
reconstruction came as a big surprise to them. There are two main reasons for it. First, the 
period was characterized by repeated business unit management change which came from 
other business areas, and were claimed to have  brought  cultural misunderstandings. 
Second, plant managers were too socially concerned, ruled by security criteria in the way it 
was.  Weak corporate communication, local reluctance to see the signs of change and too 
social involvement  by the local management  clearly demonstrates  the  difficulties in 
controlling socio-economic changes during the transition period.     
The above scenario was opposite to the situation for local management before 1970 in 
which two business managers, Sixten Sandberg and Per Collin, were particularly admired 
because of their proactive roll for expansion of the mill.  These leaders represented a 
management driven by the “heroes”, in control with enduring economic and technological 
change but also having a genuine power and care relationship to the community. These 
evidences illustrate a local management dilemma: not taking exogenous changes seriously 
while simultaneously balancing indigenous processes of change by maintaining stability.  
As a result of the corporate offensive strategy needed for industrial restructuring, local 
management had to defuse the needs of plant investments and therefore, economic goals of 
productivity and cost reductions were preferred to local improvements. Hence,  local 
management  felt that they confronted  a mission impossible since the maximization of 
capacity utilization increased the costs of keeping the mill in production. This conflicting 
situation may give an answer to the frequent change of leadership during this period.  
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The Institutionalization of Management Practice  
 
Resistance to change among local managers may be explained through passivity and a 
protection of the security in status quo.  The persistence of an institutionalized practice is 
according to Zucker
 (1977) based on facts, which can continue to exist as a part of an 
objective reality. To be persistent,  no intervening mechanisms need to be active since 
individuals act on the basis of “this is how things are done”. In her study, Zucker (1977) 
found that cultural persistence may be based on three different origins; generational 
uniformity, maintenance of the traditional culture and resistance to attempts to change. In 
the company town case, the generational uniformity and the maintenance of the culture 
have been fortified over time through the excursiveness of industrial processes and rules 
influencing the duality between actions  and keeping a given  structure. The industrial 
traditions have been transformed  through the succession from fathers to sons and the 
maintenance of the culture has been guaranteed trough the institutionalization of the rules 
of management practice. In this case, no intervening and explicit mechanism had to be 
applied since the obedience to traditions was based on the security of industrial rules built 
into  past  experiences.  We  have  noticed  that persistence was possible since  local  top 
managers followed the corporate strategy and defused the needs for local expansion. 
Following the sequential model, this cultural persistence would indicate that established 
management identity and roles for the period T2 could be maintained.  
Additionally, as locally accepted by employees and local community politicians, this 
management practice was reinforced as secure, and in control with “normal” industrial 
development. Local managers refer to the indolence in Sweden as a norm or change as a 
normal cyclic economic variation. Our interpretation is that these local managers consider 
the industrial slow down as a common “habitus” in the business field (Bourdieu, 1993). A 
habitus provides people with a sense of how to act and respond in daily life giving them a 
“feeling for the game”, what is right or wrong, that is, a practical sense. People always act 
in respect to a specific practice in a social context, which Bourdieu refers to as a “field” of 
action. We argue that the key concept of habitus and field as defined by Bourdieu, basically 
are fulfilled by local managers because of their intimate connection to industrial work, to 
the “field” and by living in a company town context.   
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The Social Consequence – A Loyalty Crisis 
 
The industrial  restructuring challenged local managers’ social involvement which was 
deeply rooted in a long tradition of a tight relationship with the local community. This 
resulted in a loyalty crisis confronting the local managers.  
We have devoted special attention to the question of social consequences of industrial 
restructuring and especially, how the social consequences were experienced as a shock 
among local managers. These managers have the belief that their description of a shock is 
shared by many in the community beyond the working force. According to Berger and 
Luckmann (1966), it requires severe biographical shocks to disintegrate the deeply rooted 
perception of reality developed in the early childhood. In our case, the ideal picture of 
management skills, taking responsibilities for local expectations of continuous 
interdependency between the company and the community, was transformed into a reality 
blaming local management for falseness and guile. In this  study we have noticed the 
vulnerability  of  a  long-lasting  company town citizenship that was  demolished  in the 
absence of a continuous proactive management involvement.   
We have observed that the social consequences have contributed to a shift of the 
organizational identity and managers’ rolls, both in respect to the company and to the local 
community. Previously, plant managers were heroes, afterwards they have been suspected 
by stakeholders in the community. One of the interviewees describe: “This caused the 
break between the mill and the community. The safety of the mill is gone. It has been 
difficult to erase the feeling of distrustfulness. We have established certain programs but it 
is hard to get rid off the distrust." According to Gioia et al. (2000), an organization’s 
identity could be seen as a label telling others who they are.    
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
This study can serve as an evidence to show how awareness of social consequences of 
retardation  is  suppressed through a prolonged period of inactive (i.e., relating to local 
development)  management  behavior.  This  behavior  may last as long as the business 
benefits of productivity exceeded the immediate costs of the restrictions. Our case indicates 
that a strategy believed as optimal on the corporate level also may, on a local level, be 23 
 
considered as a way of how to obscure and darken the social consequences of restructuring 
while utilizing resources for “only profit” purposes.   
Our research is mainly based on managers’ experiences from a company town case 
having a long tradition, and in many ways a positive experience, of tight relations between 
the dominant firm and stakeholders in the community. Sediments of these relations are very 
obvious among the top managers of the mill. Certainly these old relations should have been 
communicated, adjusted and changed along with the developments both in the industrial 
sector and society. The long term relationship between company and the town citizens 
could have involved several stakeholders taking a responsibility. Our case, focusing on 
managers of the local company, shows apparently a lack of efforts by the corporate firm to 
adjust or take explicit measures to acknowledge existing relations and their importance. 
This is somewhat surprising as one would normally believe that it would be easier and 
more natural to take care of existing good relations than building new ones. 
Our case shows a management practice from a slightly different point of view than 
traditional ‘ideal’ theory of management. The ambition of the local managers to support 
productivity under restricted conditions, i.e.,  “doing more with less” was carried out   
through a management mode of passivity that screens off local managers from acting, 
responding and being sensitive to important social requirements of change. It is suggested 
that managers in general propose change, try to cope with their environment and to control 
the development by issuing orders and manipulate incentives (March, 1981). This ideal 
emphasizes managers as being in charge of decisions and that they are keenly aware of 
concurrent environmental requirements. As is evident, managers of the local business unit 
have been excluded from the power in adopting and implementing investment measures. 
This may also be an explanation for why the local managers became rather inactive in 
promoting and maintaining previously established relations to the community. As an effect, 
local managers were caught between on one hand, struggling with productivity, increased 
costs of production due to the outdated and worn out technique, and on the other hand 
dealing with institutionalized social relations. Things were not any more in the hands of the 
local mangers, and this reality was tough to experience and, knowing about their own 
powerlessness, might be even tougher. The local managers’ shock is twofold:  
1) The experience of losing control over conventional economic management 
arrangements from long historic roots of a discourse of “heroes” including the power of 
working practice.  24 
 
2) The experience of losing control over their social role  and identity  in the 
community.  
 
There are reasons to criticize the traditional control-oriented management view as too 
narrow and not adjusted to today’s’  citizenship  reality  and  to the need for handling 
continuous change including increased (or, adjusted) CSR. This study is in line with some 
of the cases studied by Moss Kanter  (2003)  who has found that managerial work is 
undergoing enormous and rapid change with a new challenge for managers to reinvent their 
professional role. During a phase of radical transition with no preceding experience guiding 
them into a new situation, managers may recognize the loss of power, see hierarchies fade 
away and how the clear distinction of traditional elements of status  blur out in 
unanticipated ways. Moss Kanter (2003) argues “They watch traditional sources of power 
erode and the old motivational tools lose their magic.” Her study shows a managerial shift 
into new roles and tasks giving experience of chaotic situations in which managers need to 
rethink traditional ways of doing things.  
Through this case, we illustrate how management modes differ over time and can 
cause difficulty  for the local company to function efficiently and manage  its  social 
responsibilities.  From  a CC perspective,  it is therefore interesting to investigate how 
transition from local traditional management to proactive management thinking as a part of 
global strategy can occur within a multinational company. This can be done by looking at a 
successful transition process in a company town environment. Problems of understanding 
and handling uncertainty and information are repeatedly pronounced in the statements of 
local managers as well as politicians. We take this as an indication that management studies 
embracing social considerations need to address strategic management concepts, especially 
the relations and obligations between the top management levels of the corporation and 
local units. Another issue we like to highlight is the restructuring programs which 
multinational companies are usually in need to introduce in the local company. How local 
managers can handle company town processes of regeneration, such as recruitment of new 
employees, acquiring competitive resources and hiring management consultants and 
subcontractors? These questions need to be addressed in future research. 
Corporate citizenship as described in the company town case needs development and 
continuous adjustment to match with economical demands posed on the local management.  
Local managers need to develop partnership with the local community to maintain trust and 25 
 
keep everybody aware of the changes to come in the local company so that a surprise can 
be avoided.   
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